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THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR’S NEW FIDUCIARY RULE ON BROKER-
DEALERS AND THE MIDDLE INCOME 
RETIREMENT INVESTORS WHO RELY ON THEM 
Nadia Yoon+ 
Investment portfolios have become an essential part of retirement planning.1  
Given the complexities of the investment industry, seeking an expert’s advice 
makes perfect business sense.  With any commercial transaction, it should not 
be a surprise that the average customer reasonably expects (and assumes) the 
retail vendor to do his best to comply with state and federal regulations and not 
cheat his customers out of their hard-earned money.2  The same expectation 
should translate to the world of retirement investments, but that is not always the 
case. 
This expectation of contract law’s “duty of good faith and fair dealing”3 is 
similar to what the investment world calls the “fiduciary duty.”  Generally 
speaking, a fiduciary is “someone who is required to act for the benefit of another 
person on all matters within the scope of their relationship.”4  A middle income 
retail investor is not likely to worry about whether the person from whom she 
seeks investment advice is a fiduciary.  After all, there are more immediate 
concerns on her mind, such as cost of the advice, risks involved with the 
investment choice, and the reputation of the adviser.5 
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for his expertise, guidance, and endless patience throughout the writing process, as well as to 
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to thank her family, her friends, and the editors and staff members of the Catholic University Law 
Review for their patience and support during the writing and editing process of this Note. 
 1. How to build a diversified income plan, FIDELITY VIEWPOINTS (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirement/retirement-income-strategies. 
 2. See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND 
PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb 
09.pdf (analyzing and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of consumer protection statutes in 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia). 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Good faith 
in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade.”); see also U.C.C. § 2-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1977). 
 4. Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 5. Fee vs. Commission: No Doubt Which Investors Prefer, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 8, 
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110608/FREE/110609950/fee-vs-
commission-no-doubt-which-investors-prefer. 
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The complexities of entering this field as an investor begin with how to choose 
the right adviser.  Should the investor seek the advice of a registered investment 
adviser (RIA) or of a broker-dealer (BD)?6  Although the definitions of these 
two terms appear to be sufficiently clear, in practical terms, the line that used to 
separate the two is now very blurry.7  Their functions today are so similar that it 
seems the only clear difference between a RIA and a BD is their respective U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration status.8 
One would expect that without an understanding of the difference, most 
middle-income investors would seek the advice of whoever could give her the 
best value for her money.  In the end, many passive retail investors prefer BDs 
because of the lower fees; with BDs they are still receiving investment advice, 
but for less money upfront. 9  However, legally, the difference between these two 
types of advisers is absolutely critical.10  Under legal standards, the RIA has an 
obligation to act in the best interest of his clients,11 while the BD does not.12  If 
the RIA does not act in the client’s best interest, he may be liable for hefty fines 
and even criminal penalties.13  The BD may be liable for hefty fines as well,14 
                                                 
 6. See Zaw Thiha Tun, Investment Advisor Versus Broker: How They Compare, 
INVESTOPEDIA (July 15, 2015, 9:01 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071 
515/investment-advisor-versus-broker-how-they-compare.asp (explaining the differences and 
similarities between investment advisers and broker-dealers). 
 7. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 11 
(2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf (“[T]his wide spectrum of 
services and products provided by broker-dealers may or may not involve the provision of 
personalized investment advice or recommendations about securities to retail customers.”); 
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2008),  http://www. 
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2008/RAND_RB9337.pdf (noting that research 
found that one factor attributing to the lack of understanding as to the differences between registered 
investment advisers and broker-dealers is the usage of various types of titles, including generic 
titles). 
 8. See SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at iii–iv. 
 9. Fee vs. Commission: No Doubt Which Investors Prefer, supra note 5. 
 10. An RIA must comply with both SEC laws and regulations and ERISA, while a BD is 
subject to the SEC’s anti-fraud regulations and FINRA’s rules.  David C. Kaleda, What it Means 
to be an ERISA Fiduciary: A Comparison to the Securities Laws, NAT’L SOC’Y COMPLIANCE 
PROF’LS, 10–12 (May/June 2013), http://www.groom.com/media/publication/1269_ERISA_ 
Fiduciary_Comparison_to_Securities_Laws.pdf. 
 11. SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that investment advisers have 
a fiduciary duty, so they must act in the best interest of their clients at all times), vacated, 573 F.3d 
54 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 12. Dave Michaels, SEC Joins Battle on Broker Bias That Could Remake Industry, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-03-17/sec-will-develop-fiduciary-duty-rule-for-brokers-white-says (“Under current 
regulations, brokers must make ‘suitable’ recommendations, meaning the investments have to fit 
the customer’s needs and tolerance for risk.”). 
 13. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), (i) (2012). 
 14. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., DISCIPLINARY AND OTHER FINRA ACTIONS 
(July 2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/publication_file/July_2015_Disciplinary_ 
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but is able to defend against such claims by showing that the investment advice 
rendered was suitable to the client’s interests, though not necessarily in her 
interest.15  The RIA must disclose information that may affect his impartial 
advice.16  The BD, however, does not have this obligation, making way for more 
opportunities to bury hidden fees and misleading or fraudulent fine print.17 
The repercussions of choosing the wrong adviser can be significant.18  It is 
estimated that, collectively, individual retirement account investors lose about 
$17 billion annually from their investments due to BD misconduct.19  Yet, there 
are no parallel consumer protection measures in everyday commerce that would 
protect the average retirement investor from activities by her adviser, especially 
if the adviser were to mislead the investor for the adviser’s own benefit.20  The 
laws intended to regulate these conflicts of interests were inadequate because 
they remained unchanged for forty years. 21   This is the reason the U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) announced a proposed rule on April 20, 2015 aimed 
                                                 
Actions.pdf (reporting sanctions and fines imposed on firms and individuals who were found to be 
in violation of FINRA rules). 
 15. Tyler Nunnally, What Do Tougher FINRA Suitability Standards Mean for You?, 
THINKADVISOR (June 11, 2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/06/11/what-do-tougher-
finra-suitability-standards-mean-f (“If you want to steer clear of suitability violations, then it is 
imperative that your investment recommendations meet your client’s attitude to risk.  This is where 
having an accurate measure of your client’s risk tolerance is of the utmost importance.”). 
 16. Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/advoverview.htm (last updated Nov. 23, 2010) 
(“[Investment advisers] must employ reasonable care to avoid misleading clients and [] must 
provide full and fair disclosure of all material facts to [] clients and prospective clients.” (alteration 
in original)). 
 17. See Restricting Access to Financial Advice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, 
Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 114th Cong. (June 17, 
2015) [hereinafter Restricting Access] (statement of Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor). 
 18. See Ken Hawkins, The Cost and Consequences of Bad Investment Advice, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Sept. 7, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/bad-investment-
advice.asp; see also Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that a BD’s agent did not breach his fiduciary duty to his clients when he did not disclose that he 
would receive an economic benefit when he rendered advice regarding a particular plan because he 
did not receive special compensation that was clearly attributable to the investment advice); Gregg 
v. Transp. Workers of Am. Int’l, 343 F.3d 833, 842, 847–48 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that fiduciaries 
of an ERISA plan breached their duties when they failed to ensure the impartiality of the expert 
who gave advice for the retirement plan, causing the plan to sign a group healthcare policy that 
resulted in substantial loss for the plan). 
 19. See Restricting Access, supra note 17. 
 20. See generally Retail Law, HG.ORG LEGAL RESOURCES, https://www.hg.org/retail-
law.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) (describing and listing the laws, regulations, and industry-side 
regulations that govern retail and consumer law); see also Ponzi Schemes, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2016) (explaining that the best way 
to protect against a Ponzi scheme—a fraudulent investment scheme—is to ask questions); SEC 
Enforcement Actions Against Ponzi Schemes, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/enf-actions-ponzi.shtml (last updated Oct. 16, 2014) (listing enforcement actions the SEC 
took against Ponzi schemes, which were remedial measures rather than preventative). 
 21. Restricting Access, supra note 17. 
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at increasing the reach of the definition of fiduciary status under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).22 
In February 2015, recognizing the importance of retirement investment for 
Americans as part of his middle-class economics focus,23  President Obama 
directed the DOL to proceed with the introduction of a proposed fiduciary rule 
to tighten the regulation of professionals who provide investment advice.24  In 
response, the DOL issued a revised version of a similar rule it had proposed in 
2010,25 but eventually retracted amidst industry backlash.26  Many aspects of the 
2010 proposed rule remained in the 2015 proposed rule, but the new proposal 
included significant edits that reflected the criticism and input the DOL received 
during the comment period in 2010.27 
This time around, the DOL worked closely with other federal agencies also 
affected by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,28 
particularly the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.29  The 
revised proposal that was released in 2015 was a culmination of extensive 
collaborative work.  After a comment period that lasted five months,30 the DOL 
issued its final rule on April 6, 2016 with minimal substantive changes from its 
2015 proposed version.31 
U.S. Secretary of Labor, Thomas E. Perez, emphasized the importance of 
retirement security for the middle class and the rule’s goal of closing loopholes 
that permit advisers to provide bad advice that results in devastating 
                                                 
 22. See id. 
 23. Arthur D. Postal, Obama Pushes Fiduciary Standard Rule Redraft, INSURANCENEWS.NET 
(Feb. 22, 2015), http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/2015/02/22/Obama-Pushes-Fiduciary-
Standard-Rule-Redraft-a-598081.html (“Middle class economics means that Americans should be 
able to retire with dignity after a lifetime of hard work . . . But today the rules of the road do not 
ensure that financial advisers act in the best interest of their clients when they give retirement 
investment advice, and it’s hurting millions of working and middle class families.”). 
 24. Mark Schoeff Jr., Obama directs Labor Department to move ahead on fiduciary duty, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 23, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2015 
0223/FREE/150229979/obama-directs-labor-department-to-move-ahead-on-fiduciary-rule. 
 25. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263 (proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 26. Schoeff Jr., supra note 24. 
 27. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928, 21,936 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2509, 2510, and 2550). 
 28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1375 (2010). 
 29. Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,937. 
 30. Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,958 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 
and 2550). 
 31. DOL’s Finalized Fiduciary Rule Released, 401KHELPCENTER.COM, 
http://www.401khelpcenter.com/401k/meigs_final_dol_fiduciay_rule_040516.html (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2016). 
2016] DOL’s New Fiduciary Rule 227 
consequences for their middle-income clients.32  These loopholes, especially 
those involving conflicts of interests that the advisers are not required to 
disclose, result from the changes in the retirement investment landscape that had 
been around since 1974, when ERISA was first enacted.33 
Although ERISA’s standards of conduct are strict and the penalties for 
violating them are substantial,34 the rule applies these standards only to those 
who qualify as fiduciaries under the statute.35  If the advice a person renders falls 
within the statutory definition of investment advice, that person is automatically 
a fiduciary under ERISA. 36   The proposed rule intended to broaden this 
definition because its narrow scope had created a loophole for BDs, permitting 
them to escape from the liabilities of being a fiduciary under ERISA.37  The 
unfortunate consequences of this loophole were fraud and investment losses.38  
The DOL’s goal was to provide better consumer investment protection by 
creating statutory flexibility that had long been overdue.39  While the DOL’s 
final rule achieves the goal of granting important protections for retirement plan 
investors against potentially bad advice, it will impose a much more heightened 
standard of duty for BDs, which may impact accessibility to advice for middle 
and low-income investors. 
Section I of this Note lays out the fiduciary rules and standards under ERISA, 
the SEC’s Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), and the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), that applied to retirement plan BDs 
before the final rule.  Section II lays out the relevant details of the DOL’s Rule 
                                                 
 32. Restricting Access, supra note 17; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 3 (2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf (“A retiree who 
receives conflicted advice when rolling over a 401(k) balance to an IRA at retirement will lose an 
estimated 12 percent of the value of his or her savings if drawn down over 30 years.  If a retiree 
receiving conflicting advice takes withdrawals at the rate possible absent conflicted advice, his 
savings would run out more than 5 years earlier.”). 
 33. Restricting Access, supra note 17; History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
 34. See ERISA Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/ 
about-ebsa/our-activities/enforcement/erisa (last visited Sept. 6, 2016). 
 35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), (i) (2012).  The types of equitable relief that the court may 
impose on the fiduciary in breach of its duty include unpaid contributions, interest on the 
contributions, reasonable attorney’s fees, and up to double damages for each prohibited transaction 
if left uncorrected within ninety days.  Id. 
 36. See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 37. Fact Sheet: Department of Labor Proposes Rule to Address Conflicts of Interest in 
Retirement Advice, Saving Middle-Class Families Billions of Dollars Every Year, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR 4 (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/featured/protectyoursavings/ 
factsheetcoi.pdf [hereinafter DOL Fact Sheet]. 
 38. Id.; see also As You Sow v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1049–50 
(M.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that a broker committed fraud when he explicitly agreed to provide 
professional services to his clients while his real and secret intent was to misappropriate funds 
because it was a material omission). 
 39. See DOL Fact Sheet note 37, at 2. 
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and Best Interest Contract Exemption.  Section III analyzes how the rule has 
changed the fiduciary standards for BDs.  This Note concludes by exploring the 
potential impact the final rule may have for middle-income investors and 
highlights criticisms that the DOL received by industry professionals during the 
open comment period. 
I.  THE PREVIOUS STANDARDS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR REGISTERED 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR AND SECURITIES LAWS 
A.  An Introduction to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
Congress enacted ERISA as a response to mismanagement and abuse of 
private pension funds.40  Before ERISA’s enactment, private pension funds were 
regulated primarily by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),41 which proved to be 
inadequate because the IRS’s regulations “exist principally to produce tax 
revenue and to prevent evasion of tax obligations.” 42   Prior to ERISA’s 
enactment, only about five percent of workers who left the workforce with a 
pension plan received any benefits at all, and workers often lost their pension 
plans if they changed jobs.43  Congress sought to impose safeguards for workers 
against these phantom retirement security benefits, and one of the solutions was 
to tighten fiduciary responsibilities and standards.44 
1.  Fiduciary Status Under ERISA Before the Final Rule 
The simplest way to identify a fiduciary45 under ERISA is to review the plan 
documents to identify the named fiduciary, i.e., the person whose name appears 
in the written documents.46  However, any named fiduciary under the statute is 
only a fiduciary to the extent that he performs the duties described under the 
document.47  Because of this, the statute’s concept of a fiduciary includes a 
second category called “functional fiduciaries,” which are those who become 
fiduciaries because of the nature of their discretionary authority “with respect to 
                                                 
 40. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ 
ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2016). 
 41. Id. 
 42. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 207 
(Comm. Print 1976), https://ia801702.us.archive.org/18/items/legihisto00unit/legihisto00unit.pdf. 
 43. Id. at 208–09. 
 44. Id. at 229. 
 45. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsfiduciary.html (“ERISA defines a plan fiduciary to include 
anyone who gives investment advice for a fee or other compensation with respect to any moneys 
or other property of a plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so.”). 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012). 
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012). 
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the management, assets, or administration of the plan.”48  Under the current 
statute, a person is a fiduciary when: 
(i) [H]e exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or 
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he 
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or 
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.49 
Investment advisers are also fiduciaries under ERISA if they are registered 
under the Advisers Act.50 
The DOL issued a five-prong test to determine whether a person is giving 
investment advice under ERISA in order to ensure that he may be properly held 
to ERISA’s fiduciary standards.  The person must: 
(1) [M]ake recommendations on investing in, purchasing or selling 
securities or other property, or give advice as to their value (2) on a 
regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice 
(4) will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions, and (5) will 
be individualized to the particular needs of the plan. An investment 
adviser is not treated as a fiduciary unless each of the five elements of 
this test is satisfied for each instance of advice.51 
It is this definition that the DOL changed in its final rule. 
2.  Fiduciary Standard under ERISA Before the Final Rule 
The significance of determining who is a fiduciary under ERISA is the 
stringent standard by which the fiduciary must abide.52  Although the statute 
provides a list of enumerated fiduciary duties,53 courts have found that this list 
is non-exhaustive.54 
                                                 
 48. Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1161 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
 50. Id. § 1002(38)(B); see also infra note 59. 
 51. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsfiduciary.html. 
 52. Frequently Asked Questions: Fiduciary Responsibilities under an Apprenticeship and 
Training Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-atp.html (last visited Aug. 
28, 2016). 
 53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012). 
 54. See Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Because the statute does 
not enumerate or elaborate in any detail on the duties owed by a fiduciary to a plan beneficiary, the 
courts have been called upon to define the scope of a fiduciary’s responsibilities.”); see also Bixler 
v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Although the 
statute articulates a number of fiduciary duties, it is not exhaustive.”); see also Cent. States, Se. & 
Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“Rather than explicitly 
enumerating all the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the 
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Primarily, fiduciaries must act “solely in the interest of participants and 
beneficiaries” with regard to their duties.55  They must abide by four main duties: 
the duty to act prudently, the duty to diversify investments, the duty to follow 
the terms of the plan documents, and the duty of loyalty to the beneficiary.56  
Violating these duties may result in personal liability to restore losses the plan 
beneficiary incurred because of the breach.57 
B.  SEC Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Under federal securities laws, investment advisers are those who, for 
compensation, provide advice in the “purchasing, or selling [of] securities” or 
“promulgate[] analyses or reports concerning securities” as part of their regular 
course of business.58   Investment advisers are required to register with the 
SEC.59  However, brokers and dealers60 are exempt from this definition if any 
investment advice they provide is “solely incidental to the conduct of [their] 
business as . . . broker[s] or dealer[s] who receive[] no special compensation [for 
the advice].”61 
A broker is someone who is “engaged in the business of effecting transactions 
in securities for the account of others.”62  In other words, a broker acts as a 
middleman between a seller and a buyer and does not purchase the securities for 
its own account.63  A dealer is someone who is “engaged in the business of 
buying and selling securities . . . for [its] own account through a broker or 
otherwise.”64  Both brokers and dealers must also register with the SEC.65  BDs 
are those that act as both agents (brokers) and principals (dealers).66 
                                                 
common law of trusts to define the scope of their authority and responsibility.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 55. Health Plans & Benefits: Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/fiduciaryresp.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2016) 
(discussing the responsibilities a fiduciary has when running an investor’s plan). 
 56. See 29 USC § 1104(a)(1); Health Plans & Benefits: Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra 
note 55 (“Fiduciaries must act prudently and must diversify the plan’s investments in order to 
minimize the risk of large losses.  In addition they must follow the terms of plan documents to the 
extent that the plan terms are consistent with ERISA.  They also must avoid conflicts of interest.”) 
 57. Health Plans & Benefits: Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra note 55. 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012) (alteration in original). 
 59. Id. § 80b-3(a). 
 60. Broker-Dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/broker-dealer.asp 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2016) (“A brokerage acts as a broker (or agent) when it executes orders on 
behalf of clients, whereas it acts as a dealer, or principal, when it trades for its own account.”). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (alteration in original). 
 62. Id. § 80b-2(a)(3); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2012). 
 63. Broker-dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/broker-dealer.asp 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5); § 80b-2(a)(7) (alteration in original). 
 65. Id. § 78o(a)(1). 
 66. Broker-dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/broker-dealer.asp 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
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RIAs are not only subject to the SEC’s fiduciary standards under the Advisers 
Act,67 but are often also subject to ERISA’s standards, especially when dealing 
with pension funds.68  Under the Advisers Act, an RIA owes the duties of loyalty 
and care to his clients, which include the obligation to serve his clients’ best 
interests before his own, and to be reasonably well informed so that his 
recommendations are not based on materially inaccurate or incomplete 
information.69  An RIA must also fully disclose to his client any conflicts of 
interest that could influence the objectivity of the advice rendered to the client.70 
BDs, on the other hand, must generally comply with the standards of conduct 
promulgated by the SEC’s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and by self-
regulatory organizations (SRO),71 such as FINRA, because they rarely meet the 
fiduciary requirements under ERISA.72  In other words, BDs do not have any 
fiduciary obligations to their clients unless they are also RIAs or their 
relationship with their clients involves a degree of trust and confidence over 
investment advice,73 which is rarely the case.74  As a result, when BDs are only 
under the SEC’s oversight regime, they are free to suggest investments to their 
clients that may benefit them more than their own clients as long as the BDs 
comply with SEC and FINRA standards. 
FINRA is an independent organization recognized by the SEC as an enforcer 
of its own rules to protect securities investors and to ensure that “the securities 
                                                 
 67. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,425 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (defining the term “‘investment manager” as someone who is 
registered under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); see also supra note 40 and accompanying 
text. 
 69. See SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 22. 
 70. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200 (1963) (noting that the 
goal of the Advisers Act is to protect against “conduct that tempts dishonor,” and holding that 
failing to disclose material facts “must be deemed fraud or deceit”). 
 71. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,433. 
 72. Letter from Marcia E. Asquith, Senior Vice President and Corp. Sec’y, Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth., to the U.S. Dep’t of Labor 1 (July 17, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32-2/004 
05.pdf  [hereinafter FINRA Letter] (explaining FINRA’s role as the independent regulatory 
authority of the broker-dealer industry); see Ryan C. Fuhrmann, Choosing a Financial Advisor: 
Suitability vs. Fiduciary Standards, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
professionaleducation/11/suitability-fiduciary-standards.asp?layout=infini&v=1A  
(last visited Sept. 1, 2016). 
 73. Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,848, 14,849 (Mar. 
7, 2013). 
 74. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,433 n. 98 (citing cases in 
which the courts have held that broker-dealers are not generally subject to fiduciary duties unless 
the client has placed trust and confidence in the broker-dealer in the investment advice context); 
see also Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, 78 Fed. Reg. at 14,849 n. 3. 
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industry operates fairly and honestly.”75  FINRA regulates BD conduct under its 
Rule 2111 suitability standard.76  A broker must have reasonable grounds for 
believing that its recommendations are suitable for the customer based on the 
customer’s investment profile.77  The broker must also refrain from using any 
“manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance” when 
making its sales.78 
C.  Department of Labor’s Rule and Exemption 
The final rule attempts to protect the expectations of clients who receive some 
form of investment advice and rely upon this advice.79  The DOL expressed that 
passing a new regulation to protect these interests is very important because, in 
spite of dramatic changes in the types of retirement plans Americans choose 
today in comparison to when ERISA was first enacted, the rules that govern 
retirement investment advice have remained the same since 1975.80 
1.  The New Definition of “Fiduciary” 
The change to the definition of fiduciary replaces the prior five-part test.81  In 
particular, the rule redefines the types of investment advice that are subject to 
ERISA regulations as recommendations.  Under the final rule, a person(s) 
renders investment advice if, for a fee or other compensation, the advice is a 
recommendation as to (1) buying, holding, or trading securities in a pension 
plan; (2) investing in securities after the investment is “rolled over, transferred, 
or distributed from a plan”; or (3) managing the investment regarding policies 
and strategies and portfolio management, among other things.82  In addition, the 
final rule describes certain criteria that must exist before the professional is 
bound by a fiduciary duty to the client: (1) the person must “represent or 
acknowledge that they are acting as a fiduciary” under ERISA; (2) there must be 
                                                 
 75. About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., https://www.finra.org/about (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2016). 
 76. FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
http://www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
 77. 2111. Suitability, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
 78. 2020. Use of Manipulative, Deceptive or Other Fraudulent Devices, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_content.html?rbid=2403& 
element_id=5513 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
 79. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department Seeks Public Comment on 
Proposal to Protect Consumers from Conflicts of Interest in Retirement Advice (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA20150655.htm (“[I]f someone is paid to give you 
retirement investment advice, that person should be working in your best interest . . . .”). 
 80. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 2. 
 81. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,948 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 
and 2550). 
 82. Id. (describing what constitutes investment advice under the final rule). 
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some type of “agreement, arrangement, or understanding that the advice is based 
on . . . the needs of the advice recipient;” or (3) the advice is individualized to 
the needs of the recipient of the advice. 83   Finally, the rule defines a 
“recommendation” as a communication that, from an objective standard, “would 
reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or 
refrain from taking a particular course of action” based on its content or 
context.84 
2.  The “Best Interest Contract” Exemption 
Because the new definition of fiduciary is broader, the DOL has also finalized 
its Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE).85  The goal of the exemption is to 
allow entities that currently provide investment advice to retirement investors in 
the retail market, 86  but do not fall under the fiduciary status of ERISA or 
consider themselves ERISA fiduciaries, to continue providing advice without 
being in violation of ERISA provisions.87  In order to qualify for the exemption, 
the adviser must abide by a number of requirements, including the duty to 
conduct business in an impartial manner and to the best interest of the retail 
investor.88 
The proposed BICE focused on what kind of compensation these advisers 
receive that may create a conflict of interest if they become ERISA fiduciaries.89  
Some of the types of compensation that the proposed BICE intended to exempt 
included commissions paid by third parties (e.g., the plan provider, other 
investment providers, or financial institutions), revenue sharing, and other forms 
of compensation by third parties resulting from the sale of the plan.90  The final 
BICE eliminated this compensation-based limitation and implemented a more 
                                                 
 83. Id. (listing the types of fiduciary relationships that are covered under the final rule). 
 84. Id. (“[A] series of actions, directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any 
affiliate), that may not constitute recommendations when viewed individually may amount to a 
recommendation when considered in the aggregate.  It also makes no difference whether the 
communication was initiated by a person or a computer software program.”). 
 85. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,003 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
 86. See What is the Difference Between Retail Investors and Institutional Investors?, 
INVESTORGUIDE.COM, http://www.investorguide.com/article/11202/what-is-the-difference-betw 
een-retail-investors-and-institutional-investors/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).  “Retail investor” is also 
known as an “individual investor,” where the quantity of shares bought is usually small. An 
“institutional investor,” on the other hand, is a large investor such as banks, mutual funds, and 
pension funds.  Id. 
 87. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,002. 
 88. See DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 3–4 (“The ‘best interest contract exemption’ will 
allow firms to continue to set their own compensation practices so long as they, among other things, 
commit to putting their client’s best interest first and disclose any conflicts that may prevent them 
from doing so.”). 
 89. Proposed Best Interest Contract Exemption, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,960, 21,966 (Apr. 20, 2015) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
 90. Id. at 21,961. 
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flexible standard in which the fee structures the DOL attempted to regulate in 
the proposed BICE are allowed so long as the advisers “implement appropriate 
safeguards against the harmful impact of conflicts of interest on investment 
advice.”91 
To qualify for BICE status, the advisers and their firms must contractually 
agree to adhere to Impartial Conduct Standards,92 acknowledge to their clients 
that they are investment advice fiduciaries, ensure that they have adopted 
policies that would mitigate potential material conflicts of interest, not 
incentivize the advisers to provide advice that is contrary to their clients’ best 
interest, and disclose whether potential material conflicts of interest exist.93  A 
conflict of interest is material if the adviser “has a financial interest that a 
reasonable person would conclude could affect the exercise of its best judgment 
as a fiduciary in rendering advice to a Retirement Investor.”94  If the adviser does 
indeed give any potentially materially misleading advice, the DOL further 
clarified that the adviser is liable only if the advice was materially misleading at 
the time it was made.95 
The Best Interest standard is fundamental to the Impartial Conduct 
Standards.96  Under these final standards, the adviser must agree to act in the 
retail investor’s best interest by giving advice that “reflects the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances . . . that a prudent person” 
would exercise based on the investor’s goals and financial situation, “without 
regard to financial or other interests of the [a]dviser.”97  The compensation that 
the adviser receives must be no more than reasonable in relation to the services 
rendered, and whatever the adviser discloses in order to qualify for the 
exemption must not be misleading.98 
The DOL calls this a “principles-based approach” because it is a broad rule 
that adapts to a variety of business practices, as opposed to a set of objective 
requirements.99  This way, the BICE aligns with the DOL’s goal of protecting 
the interest of both the client and the adviser while still giving the adviser 
flexibility to determine how to satisfy the interests and comply with his fiduciary 
                                                 
 91. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,003. 
 92. Id. at 21,008.  The Impartial Conduct Standards require that the adviser act in his client’s 
best interest.  These standards mirror current ERISA and trust law fiduciary standards, as they also 
require that the adviser act “without regard to the financial or other interests of the Adviser, 
Financial Institution, or their Affiliates, Related Entities or any other party.”  Id. at 21,026. 
 93. Id. at 21,007. 
 94. Id. at 21,033. 
 95. Id. at 21,031. 
 96. Id. at 21,027. 
 97. Id. (alteration in original) (defining the “best interest” standard). 
 98. Id. at 21,029, 21,031. 
 99. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928, 21,929 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2509, 2510, and 2550). 
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duties. 100   This “allow[s] [advisers and] firms to continue to set their own 
compensation practices so long as they . . . commit to putting their client’s best 
interests first” and disclose any conflicts of interest that could interfere with that 
commitment.101 
II.  IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT 
The DOL estimated that a new fiduciary rule could save retail investors 
between “$95 billion and $189 billion over the next 10 years and between $202 
billion and $404 billion over the next 20 years.”102  This prediction was based 
only on the elimination of “front-end-load sharing,” 103  a scheme in which 
intermediaries, such as brokers and dealers, receive a commission from the retail 
investor for their expertise as part of an investment purchase.104  For example, if 
a client intends to invest $10,000 in a mutual fund with a three percent front-end 
load, the broker would receive $300 as commission for the purchase from the 
$10,000, but the actual investment amount for the client’s mutual fund would 
equal $9,700 instead of the original $10,000.  In a twenty-year period, an initial 
investment of $9,700 in a standard mutual fund without any additional 
contributions to the fund is estimated to yield approximately $31,109, 105 
whereas an initial investment of $10,000 would yield for the client 
approximately $32,071, all things being equal.106 
Being informed as an investor is extremely important,107 but financial literacy 
in the United States is weak.108  The additional complexities that accompany the 
current investment market for those seeking investment retirement options 
                                                 
 100. Id. at 21,929; DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 1.  In response to comments, the DOL 
also clarified that this final standard is a codification of “basic, well-established obligations of fair 
dealing and fiduciary conduct[,]” rather than being a new standard.  Best Interest Contract 
Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,032 (alteration in original). 
 101. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 3 (alteration in original). 
 102. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REGULATING ADVICE MARKETS: REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS FOR FINAL RULE AND EXEMPTIONS 9 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/conflict-of-
interest-ria.pdf. 
 103. Id. at 10. 
 104. Front-End Load, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/front-end 
load.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
 105. See Time Value of Money Calculator, THE MUTUAL FUND STORE, https://www.mutual 
fundstore.com/time-value-of-money-calculator (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (calculating the rate of 
return for mutual funds with a three percent front-end loan). 
 106. See id. (calculating the rate of return for mutual funds without a three percent front-end 
loan). 
 107. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES 1 (2013), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html  (emphasizing the importance for 
investors to make informed investment decisions). 
 108. David H. Bailey & Jonathan M. Borwein, How Financially Literate Is the Investing 
Public?, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-h-bailey/how-
financially-literate-investing-public_b_5625649.html. 
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increase investor reliance upon investment advisers for bona fide advice.109  This 
creates a system in which a non-fiduciary adviser, whether maliciously or not, 
can mislead clients for personal gain.110  As with the example of front-end-load 
sharing, if an investor was given the choice between the two returns for the same 
out-of-pocket expense, it should be obvious that the investor would prefer the 
option with the higher yield and no hidden fees. 
Before the final rule, a BD suffered no legal repercussions under ERISA for 
recommending such a plan to its investor client because it had no such duty to 
the client.111  The BD would simply need to ensure that the plan is suitable for 
its client’s needs, the current standard under the SEC and FINRA’s regime, and 
serve as the intermediary for the transaction between the plan’s provider and the 
client. 112   The final rule widens ERISA’s reach far enough to bring BDs 
engaging in such transactions relating to pension plans under its jurisdiction, 
imposing much stricter standards of conduct, unless the BD qualifies under the 
BICE.113  Once a fiduciary under ERISA, the BD will have to not only disclose 
the front-end-load sharing properly, but the BD will also be subject to ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties.114  This means that BDs have the additional burden of acting in 
their clients’ best interest. 
                                                 
 109. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928, 21,932 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2509, 2510, and 2550). 
 110. See Bailey & Borwein, supra note 108 (stating that investors can be led astray by 
investments that look good on paper, but are unsuccessful in practice). 
 111. Limitations and sanctions exist when BDs engage in such practices, but they are only 
deemed dishonest or unethical when the BD misstates or misleads the investors, not through 
omissions. See NASAA Statement of Policy: Dishonest or Unethical Business Practices by Broker-
Dealers and Agents in Connection with Investment Company Shares, NORTH AMERICAN 
SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION (Apr. 27, 1997), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/20-Dishonest_Practices.pdf (the dishonest practice may be subject to 
disciplinary action by an alternative statute). 
 112. See FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
https://www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) 
(stating that Rule 2111 requires broker-dealers to believe that a recommended strategy is suitable 
for the customer); see also Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, 
Exchange Act Release No. 51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,425 
(Apr. 19, 2005) (arguing that there have been concerns about broker-dealers and the lack of a more 
narrow rule defining suitability for their clients). 
 113. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,266 (proposed Oct. 22, 
2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 114. See, e.g., ABC Plan: 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kfefm.pdf  (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (displaying the information 
that needs to be disclosed once a BD is subject to ERISA duties). 
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III.  POSSIBLE CHANGES TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES NOW THAT THE DOL ADOPTED 
THE FINAL RULE 
A.  Many Registered Broker-Dealers Will Likely Become Fiduciaries under the 
DOL’s Final Rule Thereby Subjecting Them to ERISA’s Standards of Conduct 
As explained above, under the final rule, a fiduciary is one who provides 
investment recommendations, for a fee or other compensation, related to: (1) 
buying, holding, or trading securities in a pension plan; (2) investing when the 
investment is “rolled over, transferred, or distributed from a plan;” or (3) 
managing the investment, such as policies and strategies and portfolio 
management.115  This new definition complies with the DOL’s goal: to provide 
more adequate consumer protection measures.116  By encompassing not only 
registered advisers, but also anyone who is relied upon by investors for advice, 
the DOL intends to discourage advisers from committing fraud or taking 
advantage of their clients for their own financial gains by designating them as 
fiduciaries under the strict requirements of ERISA.117 
As a result, many BDs will likely fall within the final rule’s definition of 
fiduciary because they very often, for compensation, provide investment advice 
to their clients in the course of their regular business practices.118   Clients 
generally seek the advice of their BDs when managing their investment 
portfolios,119 and the advice is also commonly personalized to fit the clients’ 
needs and their financial status.120 
Not all BDs will be fiduciaries, however.  The DOL has clarified that those 
who act strictly as brokers or dealers, that is they act under the direction of their 
clients without providing any type of investment advice, 121  will not be 
                                                 
 115. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,948 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 
and 2550). 
 116. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 1. 
 117. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 1–2 (“Being a fiduciary simply means that the adviser 
must provide impartial advice in their client’s best interest and cannot accept any payments creating 
conflicts of interest unless they qualify for an exemption intended to assure that the customer is 
adequately protected.”). 
 118. See Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,848, 14,849 n. 
3 (Mar. 7, 2013). 
 119. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at i (“[I]nvestors rely on broker-dealers and 
investment advisers for investment advice and expect that advice to be given in the investors’ best 
interest.”). 
 120. See id. at 10–11 (“Generally, the compensation of a broker-dealer relationship is 
transaction-based and is earned through commissions, mark-ups, mark-downs, sales loads or 
similar fees on specific transactions, where advice is provided that is solely incidental to the 
transaction.  A brokerage relationship may involve incidental advice with transaction-based 
compensation, or no advice and, therefore no charge, for advice.”). 
 121. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493–94 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
SEC, under the Advisers Act, exempted from the definition of “investment adviser” any broker-
dealer who provides advice that is “solely incidental” to its brokerage services). 
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fiduciaries, just as they were not fiduciaries under the previously existing 
rules.122  In addition, the DOL also included certain types of communication that 
are exempt from qualifying as a “recommendation” under the final rule, which 
indicates that the more personalized the communication, the more likely it will 
be considered a “recommendation” under the final rule.123 
Before the final rule, BDs were held to a much lower fiduciary standard than 
RIAs under the SEC’s regime.124  While RIAs were required to disclose all 
conflicts of interest to comply with their duties of loyalty and care, BDs had 
flexibility to not disclose any self-dealing when rendering their investment 
advice as long as the advice satisfied the requirements under the suitability 
standard.125  This meant that while RIAs were required to provide objective 
investment advice so that their clients could make intelligent investment 
decisions, BDs were allowed to direct their clients to invest for the BDs’ own 
personal gains, even when investment opportunities more beneficial to the client 
were available at the time.126  In 2013 the SEC recognized this problem and 
issued a request for information regarding the potential economic effect of 
issuing a new standard of conduct for BDs that would be more comparable to 
the standard for RIAs.127 
BDs have been able to evade ERISA liability by showing that their services 
rendered did not fall under the definition of investment advice.128  The DOL 
noticed that its five-prong test for investment advice, in defining the scope of its 
                                                 
 122. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 3 (“As under the current rules, when a customer calls 
a broker and tells the broker exactly what to buy or sell without asking for advice, that transaction 
does not constitute investment advice.”). 
 123. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,997–98 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 
and 2550) (enumerating the carve-outs, which include general marketing communication, 
investment education, and providing financial data when the client requests it). 
 124. See Fuhrmann, supra note 72 (explaining that before the final rule, BDs only had to meet 
a suitability standard); see also FINRA Letter, supra note 72 (arguing that BDs should be held to 
the “best interest” standard, a higher fiduciary standard than before). 
 125. Kaleda, supra note 10, at 13. 
 126. See id. at 12. 
 127. Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,848, 14,848 (Mar. 
7, 2013) (recognizing that broker-dealers and RIAs nowadays provide essentially the same services 
for retail investors). 
 128. See, e.g., Black v. Bresee’s Oneonta Dep’t Store, Inc. Sec. Plan, 919 F. Supp. 597, 606 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that there was no fiduciary relationship between a salesperson and a 
third-party when the investment advice was only provided to the principal on an ongoing basis, 
even though the third-party relied on the same information but obtained it through the principal).  
But cf. Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114, 1117–19 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the defendant had fiduciary status because he regularly met with client to discuss 
investment strategies for compensation); Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 626–27 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that a fiduciary relationship existed when both the clients and the adviser had 
an understanding that the investment advice would be the primary basis for the client’s investment 
decisions). 
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meaning, effectually created “an ‘escape hatch’ from fiduciary status.” 129  
Because the test required that the adviser must show that it provided the advice 
on a regular basis, those who provided the advice only once had no duty to act 
in the client’s best interest.130  And because of the mutuality requirement, the 
“escape hatch” was also available for those who claimed that they did not 
understand that their client would rely on the advice as a primary basis for 
investment decisions, even if the client did, in fact, primarily rely on it.131 
Because of the DOL’s final rule, BDs must now comply with ERISA’s more 
stringent fiduciary duties unless they qualify for the BICE.132 
B.  Increased Administrative Requirements and Liabilities for Broker-Dealers 
Under the Final Rule 
BDs were able to escape the reach of ERISA because they had not been held 
to the same standards of conduct and liabilities as RIAs and other ERISA 
fiduciaries. 133   Even though FINRA’s suitability standard required that a 
broker’s recommendations be suitable based on the customer’s financial 
situation, it did not mean that the BD was required to recommend the least 
expensive plan available to the client.134  A BD that provided some form of 
advice to the client in connection with securities was able to shirk ERISA 
fiduciary duties by claiming that investment advice was ancillary to its other 
services (i.e., advice is not a primary basis for investment decisions),135 the 
compensation was not for the advice itself but for the brokerage services,136 and 
that the advice was not rendered on a regular basis.137 
Additionally, even though FINRA brought a number of disciplinary actions 
against BDs that, for example, recommended particular securities motivated by 
higher commissions,138 a BD was still in compliance with FINRA regulations as 
long as it made a recommendation that was consistent with the client’s financial 
                                                 
 129. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIDUCIARY INVESTMENT ADVICE: REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS 2, 138 (2015), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/conflictsofinterestria.pdf. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 1, 3. 
 133. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 129, at 149. 
 134. In re John M. Reynolds, 50 S.E.C. 805, SEC LEXIS 2725, at *3 (1992); FINRA Rule 2111 
(Suitability) FAQ, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., https://www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-
rule-2111-suitability-faq (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
 135. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,438 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 136. Id. at 20,425. 
 137. Id. 
 138. FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
https://www.finra.org/industry/faq-finra-rule-2111-suitability-faq (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) 
(listing examples of cases in which the “best interests” standard was violated). 
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situation and needs.139  This interpretation of the suitability standard appeared to 
be sufficiently broad to allow all but blatant violations of the standard.140 
With the final rule, a BD who has thus far been accustomed to the leeway that 
the SEC and FINRA’s standards of conduct afford will suddenly find more 
restrictions on what it can and cannot do if it renders any investment advice to 
its clients.  The only way a BD may escape from all the liabilities that accompany 
a fiduciary duty under ERISA is to qualify for the BICE.141  Qualifying for the 
BICE, however, still comes with additional administrative costs for BDs who 
want to avoid becoming fiduciaries under ERISA.  Not only must they 
contractually agree that they will put the client’s best interest first and disclose 
potential material conflicts of interest, they must also adopt compatible policies 
and retain all documents and data related to their advice,142 which will likely 
increase administrative burdens for BDs and their firms.143 
C.  The Final Rule May Shut Out Middle Income Investors Because of the 
Increased Costs 
With increased paperwork and administrative procedures come increased 
costs.  Not only is there an increase in workload, which increases labor costs by 
increasing the number of hours necessary for establishing and enforcing the new 
procedures and policies, there is also more potential for human error.144  An 
increase in the possibility of human error also means an increased possibility for 
potential liabilities, such as missing important procedures in the course of 
business or simple carelessness, which could result in an unintentional or 
                                                 
 139. See, e.g., Wendell D. Belden, Exchange Act Release No. 47,859, 80 SEC Docket 563 
(May 14, 2003). 
 140. Greg Oguss, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities Laws?, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 316 (2012) (“[T]he brokerage firm and its employees must merely adhere 
to an ordinary negligence standard of care in dealing with customers.  For wronged investors, this 
makes recovery in suitability cases – already difficult for sophisticated customers – all but 
impossible.”); see RIC EDELMAN, THE TRUTH ABOUT MONEY 188–89 (3d ed. 2004) (listing five 
common BD techniques that are illegal). 
 141. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,003 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
 142. Id. at 21,052 (laying out the standards and procedures BDs must meet to obtain BICE 
status under the final rule). 
 143. Letter from the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, to U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Sep. 
24, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB32-2-03023.pdf. 
 144. See INTERMEC, ELIMINATING PAPERWORK IS MORE THAN JUST EFFICIENT 2 (2008), 
http://www.intermec.com/public-files/white-papers/en/EAM-EliminatePaperwork_wp_web.pdf 
(“Everyday mistakes and inefficiencies are a drain on profits . . . . Mistakes are human, and when 
they happen, they cost money.”); see also Norman Ireland, The Hidden (and not so hidden) Costs 
of Paperwork, LYCEUM (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.onetouchpayroll.com/blog/2013/03/11/costs-
of-paperwork/ (“[Paper work] is tedious and typically requires that we touch the documents more 
than once often due to errors. . . . There are some obvious costs associated with paperwork, such as 
the increased time it takes to manage errors.  Errors decrease productivity for both the worker 
submitting the paperwork and the person trying to gather the data to submit the information.” 
(alteration in original)). 
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accidental fiduciary status.145  But that is not the only effect ERISA fiduciary 
duties will have on BDs. 
In addition to increased labor costs, BDs will have to add the cost of the risk 
of liability and the penalties that accompany ERISA liabilities and related 
lawsuits into their operational budgets.146  Both RIAs and BDs perform a broad 
range of services.147  Because those services currently tend to be so similar, it 
has become difficult to differentiate between someone acting as an investment 
adviser or just as a BD.148  Even though BDs generally only offer investment 
advice that is incidental to the services they provide as either brokers or 
dealers—because they may have “multiple relationships and accounts . . . with 
varying levels of service provided to each account” with their retail 
customers149—BDs are at risk of accidentally and unintentionally becoming 
fiduciaries in these complicated client relationships. 
The consequences of being in violation of ERISA duties are significant.  In 
addition to being subject to state and local laws, fiduciaries under ERISA are 
subject to civil penalties, including equitable relief and attorney’s fees and 
costs;150 and to criminal penalties,151 which have increased with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”). 152   Sarbanes-Oxley increased the 
                                                 
 145. Under the final rule, a one-time offering of investment advice is sufficient to turn an 
individual into a fiduciary.  If an individual claims that he is a fiduciary, even if under the final rule 
he would actually not qualify as one, he is also automatically deemed a fiduciary.  Bernice Napach, 
What Advisors May Not Know About the DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINKADVISOR (Aug. 26, 2016), 
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/08/26/what-advisors-may-not-know-about-the-dol-fiduciary.  
Discussion of rollovers between retirement accounts is a fiduciary act as well because explaining 
the advantages and disadvantages of doing so to the client requires impartiality.  Matt Sommer, 
Five Action Steps for Advisors to Consider in New Fiduciary Regime, JANUS (Apr., 2016), 
https://www.janus.com/resource/x171702?document=advisor%2FRetirement%2F40912_DOL%2
0Rule_FinancialPlanningMag_%200416.pdf. 
 146. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 129, at 170–72 (noting the DOL’s in-depth analysis 
on the potential costs and risks for existing and potential fiduciaries under the final rule). 
 147. See SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 7 (“Many investment advisers also engage 
in other non-advisory businesses, such as insurance broker or agent, or as a registered broker-dealer 
or registered representative of a broker-dealer.”); see also SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, 
at 8–12 (describing the broad variety of services brokers and dealers provide to their clients, some 
of which include brokerage services and products to retail customers, research and advice on 
investments, providing educational information to clients, selling securities out of their own 
inventory, and acting as principals in retirement accounts). 
 148. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 51523, Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 149. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 11. 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), (i) (2012) (the types of equitable relief that the court may impose on 
the fiduciary in breach of its duty include unpaid contributions, interest on the contributions, 
reasonable attorney’s fees, and up to double the amount of damages for each prohibited transaction 
if left uncorrected within ninety days). 
 151. See 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012) (reflecting the new criminal penalties, as amended by 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
 152. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
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criminal penalties for a violation of ERISA from fines of up to $5,000 to 
$100,000 and increased imprisonment from up to one year to ten years for an 
individual. 153   For non-individual persons, such as firms, Sarbanes-Oxley 
increased the fine from $100,000 to $500,000.154 
Unfortunately, because of these additional risks and compliance requirements, 
many industry professionals claim that service providers will inevitably shift that 
cost to their clients, by increasing the price of their services.155  Oliver Wyman, 
a management consulting firm, published its own study on the impact the rule 
could have on retail investors, finding it likely that costs for investors could 
increase anywhere between 73% to 196% as a result of the restructuring that 
investment and brokerage firms will have to undergo to comply with the new 
requirements. 156   Some see robo-advisers 157  as a potential solution to this 
problem. 158   They suspect, however, that although they may be useful for 
beginning investors, they are not the best tools for people who seek advice for 
                                                 
 153. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 805. 
 154. Id.; see Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration; Strategic Enforcement Plan, 65 
Fed. Reg. 18,208, 18,209 (Apr. 6, 2000) (“Enforcement action is warranted in such cases to ensure 
the integrity of the system even though the plan participants and beneficiaries incurred no actual 
harm.  Situations involving self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and gross imprudence are examples 
of other types of violations that may warrant investigation even in the absence of demonstrated 
harm to plan participants.”). 
 155. See Marlene Y. Satter, ICI has harsh words for DOL-proposed fiduciary rule, 
BENEFITSPRO (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/08/12/ici-has-harsh-words-for-
dol-proposed-fiduciary-rul; Aaron Vehling, High Compliance Costs Could Sink DOL Fiduciary 
Rule, LAW360 (July 20, 2015, 9:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/681069/high-
compliance-costs-could-sink-dol-fiduciary-rule; see also Democrats Against ObamaSave, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-against-obamasave-
1444601940 (surveying studies that estimate higher compliance costs). 
 156. OLIVER WYMAN, THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS IN THE U.S. RETIREMENT 
MARKET 38 (2015), http://www.fsrountable.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-role-of-
financial-advisors-in-the-US-retirement-market-Oliver-Wyman.pdf. 
 157. Robo-advisor (robo-adviser), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ 
roboadvisor-roboadviser.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) (“A robo-advisor (robo-adviser) is an 
online wealth management service that provides automated, algorithm-based portfolio management 
advice without the use of human financial planners.  Robo-advisors (or robo-advisers) use the same 
software as traditional advisors, but usually only offer portfolio management and do not get 
involved in more personal aspects of wealth management, such as taxes and retirement or estate 
planning.”). 
 158. See Janet Levaux, Who Wins, Who Loses With New DOL Rule? $3 Trillion in Play, 
THINKADVISOR (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/12/31/who-wins-who-loses-
with-new-dol-rule-3-trillion-in?t=mutual-funds (citing to Morningstar analyst Stephen Ellis who 
concluded that approximately $250 billion to $600 billion may shift from full-service adviser firms 
to passive investment management firms and robo-advisers); see also Joe Tomlinson, The DOL’s 
Fiduciary Rule: What We Can Learn from the U.K., ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2015/09/28/the-dol-s-fiduciary-rule-what-we-can-
learn-from-the-u-k.pdf (suggesting that robo-advising, while not a complete solution for lower 
income investors who would be affected by the DOL’s final rule, can be a valuable tool in 
combination with other tools, such as educating investors and subsidized financial advice, for 
retirement plan investors). 
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retirement investment plans with long-term goals, such as planning for a child’s 
education or building retirement investment portfolios.159 
Currently, RIAs’ fees are based on a percentage of the value of the assets they 
manage for their clients at an hourly or a fixed fee rate; they very rarely receive 
commission-based compensation. 160   Conversely, BDs generally charge a 
transaction-based fee or receive commissions on the transactions.161  Under the 
final rule, some BDs could feel compelled to change from their commission-
based compensation structure to a fee-based structure to offset the additional 
costs they will likely incur because of the increase in liabilities.162  This shift 
could increase costs for retail investors, lowering their return on investment, 
especially for those who do not invest actively.163  This is significant because 
those who regularly rely on BDs are generally from the middle class and seek 
investment advice on an irregular basis.164 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
When an investment adviser can easily avoid being a fiduciary by invoking 
technicalities in the statutory definition, he can successfully avoid liabilities and 
penalties under ERISA, which can be very burdensome.  However, the 
consequences of the adviser’s ability to avoid a fiduciary status have been 
significant.  When an investor relies on an industry professional for advice for 
compensation, the expectation is that the advice arises out of the duty to act in 
the client’s best interest.  The final rule is the DOL’s attempt to align this 
expectation with the adviser’s standard of conduct to protect the investor.  It has 
the potential to cause tremendous and expensive transformations in the BD 
industry.  This may end up hurting the middle-income clients in which the exact 
regulations were meant to help. 
                                                 
 159. See Larry Ludwig, The Rise of the Robo-Advisors – Should You Use One?, 
INVESTORJUNKIE (Aug. 14, 2016), https://investorjunkie.com/35919/robo-advisors/ (explaining 
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